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During the twentieth century, internal migration and urbanization shaped Brazil’s 
economic and social landscape. Cities grew tremendously, while immigration 
participated in the rapid urbanization process and the redistribution of poverty between 
rural and urban areas. In 1950, about a third of Brazil’s population lived in cities; this 
figure grew to approximately 80 per cent by the end of the nineteenth century. The 
Brazilian population redistributed unevenly—some dynamic regions became population 
magnets, and some neighbourhoods within cities became gateway clusters in which the 
effects of immigration proved particularly salient. This study asks, has domestic 
migration to cities been part of a healthy process of economic transition and mobility for 
the country and its households? Or has it been a perverse trap?  
 
Keywords: urbanization, migration, mobility, poverty, households, Brazil 
JEL classification: R2, O54, N96  
The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was 
established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and 
training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The Institute 
undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural changes 
affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a forum for the 
advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally 
sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening and training in the 
field of economic and social policy making. Work is carried out by staff 
researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of 
collaborating scholars and institutions around the world. 
www.wider.unu.edu publications@wider.unu.edu 
 
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) 
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland 
 
Typescript prepared by Lorraine Telfer-Taivainen at UNU-WIDER 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply 
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of 
any of the views expressed. 




During the twentieth century, internal migration and urbanization shaped Brazil’s economic 
and social landscape. Cities grew tremendously, while immigration participated in the rapid 
urbanization process and the redistribution of poverty between rural and urban areas. One 
third of the population lived in cities in 1950, but with an average yearly urban growth rate of 
5 per cent Brazil turned into a prominently urban country (80 per cent of the population at the 
turn of the century). Due to immigration to urban centres, the Brazilian population 
redistributed unevenly: some dynamic regions became population magnets, and some 
neighbourhoods within cities became gateway clusters in which the effects of immigration 
proved particularly salient. But has domestic migration to cities been part of a healthy process 
of economic transition and mobility for the country and its households, or a perverse trap? To 
date, no evidence exists for Brazil but worldwide data has been used to show that if 
urbanization fostered economic growth and helped reduce absolute poverty in the aggregate, 
it did little for urban poverty (worldwide data decomposition by Ravallion et al. 2007). 
Rapid urbanization placed strong pressure on cities to use their limited resources to meet or 
facilitate the increased demand for basic services; local authorities, denizens and newcomers 
had to adapt to non-natural population growth, its labour market and organizational 
implications. Receiving areas (in particular local authorities) have been challenged by 
immigration that added to near-term demands for water and sanitation, solid waste removal, 
electricity, basic education and health, housing, transportation, traffic and pollution 
(CEPAL/HABITAT 2001). The local population has had to deal with immigrants who came 
from different socioeconomic backgrounds, and older immigrants with individuals who were 
channelled to the city through their own network connections. Immigrants too had to adapt to 
new environments, find housing and transportation, and learn new skills. However, while 
most urban planners (as well as the poor themselves) can pinpoint the most pressing needs 
induced by immigration in their municipalities, careful quantitative assessments of the impact 
of domestic immigration on cities’ poverty rates and access to public goods are still few and 
far between. 
In Brazil, migration was mainly from rural to urban municipalities during 1950-70. Migrants 
benefited from widespread access to social infrastructure and migration was linked to upward 
social mobility (Faria 1991). Starting in the 1970s, immigration led to the outbreak of favelas 
and internal migrants started preferring medium-sized cities (100,000 to 500,000 inhabitants), 
due to the limited absorption capacity of the largest cities. 
More recently, and in a country where more than four-fifths of the population is already 
urban, spatial movements have changed and urban-urban (UU) flows currently predominate. 
The main bulk of migration operates between urban centres (62 per cent), followed by rural 
to urban (18 per cent), urban to rural (13 per cent) and rural to rural (7 per cent) migration. 
The pattern of migration has diversified in terms of places of origin and destination—
migrants come from all state and do not choose exclusively the southern regions, and prefer 
medium-sized cities to megalopolises. Positive selection happened along educational 
attainment: 27 per cent of the highly educated population of rural areas migrated (between 8 
and 12 per cent for all other categories of education; 13 per cent of the urban population with 
a higher education leave, versus 7 per cent for non-educated urban emigrants). Richer rural 
localities experience higher rates of emigration, with a larger proportion of the migrants 
moving within their municipality and a smaller proportion moving out-of state. While the 2 
richest quintile shows out-migration rates of above 16 per cent, the poorest quintile hardly 
reaches 7 per cent,1 less than half of the former. 
Understanding whether receiving cities incur higher social costs due to immigration is 
fundamental for local urban authorities to turn immigration into a healthy process of mobility 
for the country and its households. Although lately urban population growth resulted mainly 
from natural population growth in Brazil (Bilsborrow 1998), immigration continues to play a 
substantial role and has been shown to be correlated with slums development. Many 
immigrants with low adaptive capacity find themselves crowded into densely packed shanty 
towns because of the lack of affordable housing, little or no access to resources such as safe 
water and public health services. The policy issues surrounding immigration to urban centres 
transcend urban population growth alone. 
Such issues as the consequences of migration for overall poverty are of paramount 
importance, even beyond any considerations of pressures on infrastructure stemming from 
rapid urban growth. Overcrowding due to high rates of immigration has been shown to be 
correlated with higher morbidity and mortality—see the evidence on tuberculosis in São 
Paulo in Ferreira et al. (2001). Cities have also become areas of massive sprawl and serious 
environmental problems. In São Paulo many workers travel to and from work by bus, 
spending around four hours per journey due to the extensive sprawl (over 500 undulating 
square miles), and the subway lines are no longer sufficient. The four million cars that 
circulate daily through the city have caused such severe pollution that officials have placed 
pollution monitors around the city to inform residents about air conditions (Robinson 1989).  
In spite of five decades of abundant research, some key policy questions on the impact of 
internal immigration have not found clear answers yet. Do immigrants increase poverty rates 
of the city of arrival? Do they entail reductions in welfare of the resident population? What 
type of immigrants is particularly harmful or beneficial for receiving cities? Do receiving 
cities keep up with the same provision of public services (such as sewage connection, 
garbage removal, street parking and lighting) when they incur higher immigration rates? Do 
higher immigration rates lead to higher geographical segregation within receiving cities?  
Empirical evidence on the role of internal migration in less developed countries (LDCs) has 
thus lagged behind because of issues related to data scarcity. First, data was scarce and 
coverage was not exhaustive. Second, many studies failed to account for self-selection into 
migration. Third, omitted variables that were not observed by the researcher could be driving 
both immigration inflows and housing costs. Immigrants maybe responded to other factors 
that caused poverty to decrease, such as expectations of future economic growth, improved 
amenities, or changes in the preferences for existing amenities, which could lead to an 
overestimation of the impact of immigration. Fourth, immigration could be endogenous, as 
immigrants may be looking for better deals. They might settle in areas where poverty is 
decreasing more rapidly, so that if immigration inflows are very sensitive to poverty and 
amenities changes, then the estimates of the relation between immigration and poverty and 
infrastructure access could be biased downward. 
Our analysis is novel in three respects: most studies used specific household surveys on 
migration; representative for a geographic subsample of the population; using limited 
information on place of origin of immigrants (region born or moved from). First, we use 
                                                 
1 Author’s computation. 3 
census data representative at the municipality level for the whole country of Brazil. Our data 
come from the 12.5 per cent sample of Brazil’s 2000 census, which includes a detailed 
migration questionnaire at the individual level—current and last place of residence, place of 
residence in 1995, state of birth. The place of residence today and in 1995 is recorded at the 
municipality level. This contrasts with most of the data on internal migration; census and 
sample survey data normally report only a limited range of population movements (place of 
current residence and place of birth only are listed in the records, disaggregation of the place 
of origin is rough) (few regions, sometimes distinction between urban and rural). Naturally, 
this precludes estimation of the extent of rural-urban mobility within a region, from the date 
of birth. Second, to draw causality inferences, we instrument immigration rates to a receiving 
city by the combination of three variables: adverse economic shocks in the municipality of 
departure, proportion of emigrants from the municipality of departure and Euclidian distance 
between the municipality of origin and that of arrival. While the first two variables explain 
the urge to leave one’s place, the last explains the choice of the place of arrival. Third, we 
look at poverty rates and infrastructure access, not average income only: after having selected 
different welfare measures (monetary poverty, basic infrastructure accessibility), we choose 
to look at the effect of immigration on municipalities’ revenues and spending, and eventually 
at the geographic polarization of populations within cities of arrival. 
2 Empirical  specifications 
Immigration is a process by which immigrants change location in order to improve their 
expected welfare status. The decision to leave can either be (i) a voluntary choice or (ii) an 
involuntary resettlement due to the consequence of adverse conditions at the place of origin 
(covariate shocks such as climate change or crisis; idiosyncratic shocks such as job loss or the 
death of a household member). 
Voluntary migration concerns people who (i) are intrinsically mobile. Those migrants may 
have observable characteristics that explain their preference for mobility: gender, season-
related jobs, no family, unfinished education that requires moving to a larger urban centre, 
highly demanded skills that they can value, adaptive, polyvalent and interchangeable abilities. 
They may also have unobservable characteristics that explain their geographic flexibility 
(personal history and preferences). (ii) They may have relatively more reliable information on 
where they are going to and will not be afraid to migrate far: better access to information in 
general, personal effort engaged to collect information and to ensure that migration will offer 
them better opportunities, network of friends or family who has already migrated. (iii) 
Voluntary migrants are taking rational decisions: they have already secured positions in the 
place they are going to, whether it be through network connections or because they were 
offered a higher position in the place of arrival. Rationality implies that individuals with 
better education, skills and labour market experience have a comparative advantage in job 
search at destination labour markets, and therefore are more likely to migrate. Thus voluntary 
migration is seen as a selective, rather than random, process, and whilst migrants self-select 
in this way, the same logic of rationality implies that non-migrants do not move because their 
comparative advantage lies in staying. 
Involuntary resettlement will affect (i) regions most vulnerable to shocks. Regions which 
economies are agriculturally-based will be more affected by weather shocks; municipalities 
where economic output is concentrated on few activities will be more vulnerable to changes 4 
in economic activity. (ii) Unplanned immigration will affect disproportionately the most 
vulnerable: poorer individuals, households with highly volatile income, single-headed 
families, older people, and individuals with the least adaptive skills. Consequently, it can be 
derived that other things being equal, unplanned immigration is more likely to originate from 
ex ante worse-off groups, less educated and less skilled. The decision to migrate here is not 
always imposed stricto-senso2 on households. Rather, we call involuntary immigration a 
process of resettlement that does not represent an attractive alternative, but a process chosen 
out of necessity, a last resort option. Because poorer households face tighter financial 
constraints, migration costs may limit the set of available destination choices (close-by 
cities), and therefore the potential benefits of mobility. The implication is that in the latter 
case migration is likely to exacerbate poverty and vulnerability as involuntary immigrants 
may suffer from social exclusion in the place of arrival (inequitable access to economic 
assets: savings), human capital (education), social capital (networks), cultural capital 
(ethnicity), geography (distance from economic activity) and political capital (participation). 
Our empirical specifications will try to answer the following questions: what is the impact of 
higher immigration intake on poverty rates at the city of arrival? Does voluntary (as opposed 
to involuntary) immigration generate lower levels of poverty, higher revenues per capita, an 
improvement of housing facilities and public infrastructure access? Are less adaptive groups 
increasing poverty rates? Is the impact of immigration modified by the absorption capacity of 
the receiving city? Is it modified by the complementarities between natives and migrants on 
the labour market? Are municipalities investing more in private and public infrastructure 
where immigration is higher? Do urban centres experience higher polarization rates? 
2.1 Overall impact of immigration 
Let Y refer successively to one of the poverty and infrastructure access indicators mentioned 
above.3 Equation (2) shows the impact of migration rates on poverty measures: 
 
where  00 stands for year 2000, c denotes the urban municipality of arrival and inmig 
represents immigration rate to the city of arrival.4 X is a set of municipality controls in 1995 
(such as city size, state of localization, government spending), out-migration rates and natural 
population growth between 1995 and 2000. ε is a normally distributed error term. The 
coefficient of interest here is β. Since immigration rates respond to differences in regional 
utilities, they are endogenous to Y00,c, i.e. Cov(inmig00,c, Y00,c) ≠ 0. Due to reverse causality 
between Y00,c and inmig00,c, and to correctly estimate β, we choose to instrument migration 
rates  inmig with the coefficient of variation of the unemployment rate in m ( CVm), the 
logarithm of the distance to migrate between m and c (ln(distm,c)), and the interaction of CVm 
and ln(distm,c). 
Immigration from municipality m to city c is the consequence of the combination of factors in 
m, in c and the difference in these factors between m and c. Individuals are more likely to 
                                                 
2 The restrictive understanding embraces wars, ethnic or racial cleansing, development-induced relocation. 
3 Headcount ratio, income inequality and polarization measures, public infrastructure access (water, electricity, 
sewage connection, garbage removal), inequality and polarization of access to infrastructure. 
4 Proportion of immigrants out of total city population, that is   5 
take the decision to migrate if the economic situation they are facing at the place of origin (m) 
is bad or getting worse. When choosing c, potential migrants will take into account the 
characteristics of the place of arrival: job opportunities, wages, employment rates, amenities, 
situation improvement (difference between situation at c and m), distance to travel. The only 
variables exogenous to the situation of c in 2000 are the economic situation at m and the 
distance between m and c. Hence: 
•  As suggested by migration models, economic instability at the place of origin is often 
found to be highly positively correlated with the propensity to emigrate (variation in 
climate, employment rates, political situation, violence and safety). We select the 
coefficient of variation of the unemployment rate in m (CVm) to measure how 
volatile economic opportunities are at the place of origin and thus how likely 
individuals are to leave their municipality hoping for a more stable environment. 
•  As suggested by gravity models, distance is an impediment to migration and is often 
found to be highly negatively correlated with the propensity to migrate. Migration 
decreases with increased distance from the origin for several reasons: distance is a 
proxy for direct (transportation) and psychic costs of moving. As distance increases, 
time spent traveling and not working increases (earnings foregone get larger). The 
farther away the new labour market, the more likely people’s skills are to become 
unadapted (smaller income gains from migration). Information costs rise with 
distance: uncertainty about the final place of destination deters people living farther 
away from moving there. We thus draw heavily on the framework of gravity models, 
which explains relative attractiveness and repulsion by the size of each municipality 
(origin and destination): the larger the municipality, the more likely it is to become a 
centrifugal point (‘city lights’ factor), the smaller the municipality, the more likely it 
is to become a centripetal point: 
, where β and γ are 
assumed to be negative, and δ positive. 
 
As a result, the set of instruments we construct consists of the coefficient of variation of the 
unemployment rate in m (CVm), the logarithm of the distance to migrate between m and c 
(ln(distm,c)), and the interaction of CVm and ln(distm,c). 
 
 
Going back to equation (2), the endogenous variables (migration rate to city c) is defined as: 
 
where  c  is the migration flow between municipality m and the city of arrival c 
between 1995 and 2000. Each municipality to municipality migration flow   is then 
instrumented by  . As suggested by gravity models, we control for ln(popm,95) and 
ln(popc,95), the respective log-sizes of city of origin and destination before migration 
(included in   and  ). The first stage of our 2SLS method is thus: 6 
 
which is estimated with geographic fixed effects (municipality of origin). A larger value of 
CVm means a more volatile labour market at origin m and thus a municipality m from which 
individuals are more likely to leave. We can assume that m’s economic condition will not 
have any direct effect on c’s economic conditions (poverty, inequality, infrastructure access, 
and public finance) other than through immigration rates. A larger value of ln(distm,c) means 
more distant municipalities, higher costs of migration: c is a potentially less attractive place 
to choose from. We can assume that travel distance will not have any direct effect on poverty, 
inequality or infrastructure access of the place of arrival. The interaction of CVm  and 
ln(distm,c) ensures that the first-stage equation is not equivalent to fixed-effect model. Since 
none of the components of instm,c are assumed to have a direct impact on Y00,c, instm,c validates 
the exclusion restriction. 
 
From the first-stage equation (4), we predict   and estimate 
the second-stage equation (2). Instead of 
using , we correct the standard errors on β 
using McFadden’s correction method. The two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimate 
, is obtained by regressing (OLS) setting the 
explanatory variable inmig00,c on the instrument instm,c, computing fitted values  , 
and again regressing (OLS) Y on  to obtain the I.V. estimator  . Had we not 
corrected the standard errors, we would have estimated the variance of the second-stage 
regression (equation (2)) based on the residuals  , which is 
asymptotically biased upward (see Engle (2011) for proof). Instead, we use the consistent 
estimate of σ
2
 given by  . 
2.2  Impact of different groups of migrants 
To analyse the differential impact of immigration rates of different nature, we then construct 
several vectors of migration rates inmig00,c: 
•  urban and rural migrants from the municipality, the state, out-of state, 
•  gender-age categories, 
•  no education, primary, secondary, and higher education, 
•  length of stay. 
 
 
where    is a vector of mutually exclusive immigration rates to c by category i 
( ). 
Each migration rate of group i to city c is defined as: 7 
 
 
We run a separate regression for each new vector. In this case, since we need to construct as 
many instruments as RHS endogenous variables, we chose add the number of emigrants 
(from each category: urban and rural, men and women, etc.) from the municipality of 
departure ( ), and the interaction term  . The number of people 
who left from municipality m to city c is correlated with the total number who left 
municipality m between 1995 and 2000. However, we assume that the total number of people 
who left m is does not have a direct impact on poverty, inequality and infrastructure access at 
c. The first stages become: 
 
 
Individuals belonging to category i are assumed to be influenced in their decision to migrate 
by the attitude of their peers. But  should not affect directly the outcome variables Y00,c 
in the city of arrival c other than through   since the number of migrants of group I to 
Belo Horizonte, Rio de Janeiro, and Campinas should not affect poverty measures in São 
Paulo. Each   is hence instrumented by a combination of the ln(distm,c), CVm and the 
likelihood that people from category i will migrate out of m. As before, we predict 
and estimate the second-stage equation (5). Again, we 
correct the standard errors following Engle (2011). 
3 Data 
Most of the data comes from the 12.5 per cent module of Brazil’s 2000 Population Census. 
The module collected individual-level information on age and gender, ethnicity, education 
and activity, migration, and income per capita. In addition, it collected household-level 
information about the structure and nature of housing, access to water, electricity, garbage 
removal, public lighting and street pavement. We also draw on a variety of indexes 
constructed by IBGE5 and IPEA. Consumption-based poverty measures were obtained by 
Ferré and Leite (2006) using the technique of Small Area Estimates applied to the 2000 
Census and the 2002-03 household survey (POF). The analysis is largely carried out at the 
municipality level (or metropolitan area for the largest cities)6 of which Brazil counts 5,507 
spread in 27 states, divided into 5 main regions (north, north-east, south-east, south, and 
centre-west). As most municipalities encompass an urban and a rural part, we further divide 
municipalities into two ‘submunicipalities’, each of them being exclusively urban or rural. 
The following migration flows were constructed:  
                                                 
5 Instituto Brasileo de Geografía e Estadísticas (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics). 
6 Urban centres are usually made of one municipality. However, the municipalities of the 25 largest 
agglomerations are grouped to form Metropolitan Areas. 8 
•  Origin: migrants can come from five different geographic origins. (i) Individuals can 
migrate from the rural part of a municipality to its urban part (intra-municipality 
migration). Individuals can migrate from (ii) an urban or (iii) a rural sub-municipality 
to an urban centre within the same state (intra-state migration). Or they can migrate 
from (iv) an urban or (v) a rural sub-municipality to an urban centre out of their state 
of origin (inter-state migration). All five categories are mutually exclusive. 
•  Education: we divided educational attainment into four categories: none, primary 
corresponding to 1-7 years of education, secondary corresponding to 8-11 years, and 
higher for any individual with more than 12 years of schooling. 
•  Age-gender: to isolate population groups that are most likely to migrate, we divide the 
population into four age-gender groups: male aged 20-35, other male, female (20-35) 
and other female. This structure corresponds to the findings of CEPAL/HABITAT 
(2001) on the age-gender structure of migration in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
•  Length of migration stay: to distinguish between recent and less recent migrants, we 
also divide immigration flows into 5 length-of-stay groups: less than one year, 1-2 
years, 2-3, 3-4, 4-5.7 
 
An important part of this paper centres on three poverty measures: the incidence of poverty 
(also called the headcount ratio, or FGT0); the depth of poverty (FGT1); and the severity of 
poverty (FGT2). In addition, there are also numerous non-monetary dimensions of poverty, 
such as access to health and education services, public (transportation, sanitation, cleaning 
services) and private infrastructure access (water, power, garbage collection, etc.). In urban 
areas, housing problems are particularly salient and visible, in view of the high population 
density, which requires higher service standards for public and environmental safety, and 
does not readily permit traditional building methods. Due to the limitation of the data, we 
focus on four measures of infrastructure access: sewage (personal connection to the drainage 
system), garbage removal, street pavement and lighting16. We compute city- and census-
track-level access to sewage, garbage removal, street pavement and lighting. We also 
compute polarization indexes to measure the degree to which the distribution of a variable is 
made of ‘peaks’ and the distance that separates those ‘peaks’ within a city. We complement 
infrastructure access with measures of government and citizen participation: municipality 
spending on urban projects, and on local development.8 
As for the variables used for the instrument, the Euclidian distance between each pair of 
municipalities’ centroids was computed using georeferenced techniques and led to a vector of 
12.5 million distances. An index of unemployment volatility at the municipality of origin, 
using IPEA data on unemployment rates was computed. Unemployment series were available 
at the microregion level of which Brazil counts 500. For each microregion, the 
unemployment series were available for rural and urban populations separately. The 
coefficient of variation was computed over the first 5 years of the 1990s (1990-95). 
                                                 
7 It should be emphasized that we cannot account for less-than-five-year movements in the sequencing of 
migration episodes between 1995 and 2000. We will not be able to track people who migrated out and back to 
their original municipality within five years. Nor will we be able to track people who migrated more than once 
in the five-year period. 
8 Although electricity and water indicators were available, we decided to skip them due to quasi-universal 
coverage. All measures are per capita. 9 
4 Findings 
Table 2 shows the results of the first-stage (equations 4 and 7) for the regional breakdown of 
migrants.9 For more clarity, the dependent variable   has been multiplied by 
100 and can be interpreted as a percentage. ln(distm,c) is negatively correlated with migration 
between  m and c, suggesting that distance is an impediment to population movements. 
Distance is more of an impediment to migrate for people moving within state. Similarly (the 
results are not presented here) people with less education, women and older people. This 
suggests that less adaptive and more vulnerable migrants incur higher costs to migrate due to 
distance. CVm is negatively correlated with out-migration, confirming that people have more 
incentives to leave a municipality where employment is not stable. Employment volatility is a 
higher emigration factor for individuals of rural origin (Table 2), for uneducated migrants, 
older men and women, and it is increasingly more important for migrants who stayed longer 
in the receiving city. This again suggests that more vulnerable migrants have a higher 
probability of leaving due to adverse economic conditions in the place of departure. In 
equation (7), when the proportion of out-migrants from the municipality of origin of each 
sub-group category is displayed, it is always positively correlated with out-migration. 
Emigration from one’s sociodemographic group is more of a push factor for people coming 
from urban background, the less educated, women and older people, suggesting that for those 
age groups ‘group departure’ happens more often. 
4.1  Impact of immigration on poverty 
Higher immigration rates entail reduction in overall and local poverty rates of the receiving 
cities Table 3). Looking at the magnitude of the coefficients (respectively -0.044 and -0.045), 
doubling the average immigration rate (10.2 per cent) would entail a reduction of 1.4 per cent 
of current urban poverty rates (HCR = 33 per cent with income). The results are confirmed by 
the regressions using SAEs (column 3), for which the magnitude of the coefficient is quite 
different (-0.029) but the same reasoning (doubling of the average immigration rates) would 
entail a reduction of 1.5 per cent of urban poverty rates (HCR = 20 per cent with 
consumption). All results are displayed in the first 3 columns of Table 3. 
Reduction in poverty measures are largely due to rural and low educated immigrants, 
suggesting that when immigrants do not compete with locals (complementary productive 
tasks), poverty levels go down. Table 4 shows that immigrants with urban origins have no 
significant impact on poverty rates, suggesting that this category does not lead to any 
noticeable crossings of the poverty line. Figure 1 looks at per capita income differences 
between immigrants and locals; Figure 2 shows that urban immigrants earn slightly more 
than denizens. The income difference increases with age, even more so in the largest cities. 
On the other hand, immigrants with rural origins (coming from the same or another state) 
entail reductions in overall and local poverty rates, while migrants coming from the rural 
parts of the municipality participate in the relocalization of poverty in the urban 
neighbourhoods, without affecting the local population. Hence rural immigrants coming for 
far induce reduction in poverty of the local population, suggesting that local households 
benefit from the complementarities of locals and immigrants productive tasks. 
                                                 
9 For the whole set of first-stages, please refer to the extended version of the paper. 10 
Non-educated migrants (less than primary education) entail reductions in poverty rates of the 
local population, while highly educated migrants (secondary and higher) deteriorate the 
welfare situation of locals (see Table 6: IV Results, breakdown by educational attainment). 
The two stories (urban-rural and educational breakdowns) can be reconciled by Figure 1: 
immigrants from urban areas are over-represented among workers with very high skills where 
competition is likely to be high and substitution low, and immigrants from the municipality 
are over-represented in the ‘no education’ category which is most likely to be poor. On the 
other hand, immigrants from rural areas are slightly more represented in lower levels of 
educational attainment but only by little. 
4.2  Impact of immigration on infrastructure access 
Higher immigration rates lead to better access to public infrastructure (columns 4-7 of 
Table 3). Three out of the four indicators of access to public services (street paving and 
lighting, sewage connection and garbage removal) are positively affected by higher 
immigration rates: multiplying by two average immigration rates would entail an increase of 
24 per cent of street lighting, 14 per cent of street paving and 29 per cent of garbage removal. 
Sewage connections do not seem to be affected, which can be explained by their relative 
inelasticity: extending the sewage network implies high costs to be borne by the municipality, 
requires qualified construction workers and takes time. The poorest rural immigrants (out-of 
state and from the municipality) are associated with worsening of public infrastructure 
access, especially street paving and lighting. 
Higher rates of female immigration have a positive impact on infrastructure access. Larger 
intakes of women have a positive impact on garbage removal and street lighting (Table 7), 
suggesting women’s preference for sanitation and safety. There is however no impact of 
‘time since migration’ on those outcomes, invalidating the assumption that immigrants who 
planned to stay longer participated in improving access to public equipment. 
Higher immigration rates entail lower spending per capita on urban projects.10 However, 
public spending on urban projects increase with higher proportions of rural migrants and 
decreases with higher proportions of urban immigrants (column 8 of Table 4), suggesting that 
improvements in infrastructures access is rather well targeted. 
4.3  Local emigration, spatial segregation, and polarization 
Higher immigration intake does not lead to higher local emigration, or to polarization. Even 
breaking down immigration rates by origin, age-gender, education or years since- migration 
categories, no clear pattern seem to come out (see last column of Tables 2 to 6). Higher 
immigration rates don’t seem to have an impact on polarization indexes either (Table 7) 
suggesting that recent immigration does not systematically lead to local selective emigration, 
by which people with the same socioeconomic background would converge to the same 
neighbourhoods. Even after decomposition into groups, there was no evidence of increased 
polarization due to higher immigration intake. Robustness checks were conducted using the 
structure of housing and no effect was found. 
                                                 
10 Similar results were obtained using investment per capita on local development. 11 
5 Conclusions 
This paper goes against some current literature in migration patterns and urbanization. It 
provides evidence that domestic immigration to Brazil 5,500 cities reduced poverty, 
increased infrastructure access and did not increase local polarization and geographic 
segregation. The positive effect on poverty reduction is found to be mainly due to categories 
of migrants that have characteristics complementary to locals’ (immigrants from rural origin, 
or with low educational attainment), while improvements in infrastructure access are mainly 
seen after higher intakes of female immigration. 
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Figure 1: Education of migrants and denizens 
 
Source: See section 3; author’s computations. 
 
Figure 2: Income of migrants and denizens 
 
Source: See section 3; author’s computations. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of the city of arrival by quintile of migration rate 
 
Source: See section 3; author’s computations. 
Table 2: First stage: main specification and geographic breakdown 
 
Source: See section 3; author’s computations. 
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Source: See section 3; author’s computations. 
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Table 9: IV Results, polarization 
 
Source: See section 3; author’s computations. 
 